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The inverse fallacy and quantum formalism
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Abstract. In the present article we consider the inverse fallacy, a well known
cognitive heuristic experimentally tested in cognitive science, which occurs for intuitive
judgments in situations of bounded rationality. We show that the quantum formalism
can be used to describe in a very simple and general way this fallacy within the quantum
formalism. Thus we suggest that in cognitive science the formalism of quantum
mechanics can be used to describe a quantum regime, the bounded-rationality regime,
where the cognitive heuristics are valid.
§ To whom correspondence should be addressed riccardo.franco@polito.it
The inverse fallacy and quantum formalism 2
1. Introduction
This paper considers how the inverse fallacy can have a natural explanation by using
the quantum formalism to describe estimed probabilities. We have written this article
in order to be readable both from quantum physicists and from experts of cognitive
science. Quantum mechanics, for its counterintuitive predictions, seems to provide a
good formalism to describe puzzling effects such as the cognitive heuristics. In particular,
violations of Bayes’ rule have been predicted form quantum formalism [1].
More generally, a number of attempts have been done to apply the formalism
of quantum mechanics to domains of science different from the micro-world with
applications to economics [2], operations research and management sciences [3] and
[4], psychology and cognition [5] and [6], game theory [7], and language and artificial
intelligence [8].
This paper is organized as follows: first we recall the Bayes’ theorem and the main
results about inverse fallacy and base-rate fallacy. Then we define the main concepts
of quantum formalism and show how the inverse fallacy founds a natural explanation.
Finally, we note that the conjunction fallacy and the inverse fallacy have, by means of
the quantum formalism, a common origin.
2. The Bayes’ theorem and the inverse fallacy
The Bayes’ theorem is an important result in probability theory which tells how to
update or revise beliefs in light of new evidence a posteriori. Suppose for example that
a clinician knows that
(a) only 5% of the overall population suffers from disease X,
(b) 85% of patients who have the disease show the symptom, and
(c) 25% of healthy patients show the symptom.
We can rewrite these data in terms of probabilities: P (D) = 0.05 the probability that
the patient is contaminated by the disease, P (D′) = 0.95 the probability that the patient
is not contaminated by the disease, P (S|D) = 0.85 the probability that a patient who
has the disease shows the symptom and P (S|D′) = 0.25 the probability that a patient
who hasn’t the disease shows the symptom According to Bayes’s theorem, the posterior
probability that a patient who shows the symptom is contaminated by the disease can
be calculated as follows:
P (D|S) = P (S|D)P (D)
P (S|D)P (D) + P (S|D′)P (D′) . (1)
Thus we have that P (D|S) = 0.850.05
0.850.05+0.250.95
= 0.15, which means that there is only
a 15% chance that the patient examined has the disease even if he presents a highly
diagnostic symptom.
The inverse fallacy [9] is the erroneous assumption that P (D|S) = P (S|D). It is
also called conversion error [10], the confusion hypothesis [11], the Fisherian algorithm
[12]. the conditional probability fallacy and the prosecutor’s fallacy [13]. In particular,
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this last name evidences the fact (noted in many studies) that both expert and non-
expert judges often confuse a given conditional probability with its inverse probability.
In a different filed, [14] evidences that clinicians consider that the probability of the
presence of a symptom given the diagnosis of a disease is on its own a valid criterion for
diagnosing the disease in the presence of the symptom. This result has been later
experimentally demonstrated in [15, 16], where it has been found that the median
judgments of P (D|S) is almost equal to the presented value of the inverse probability,
P (S|D). Similarly, [17] investigated how physicians estimated the probability that a
woman has breast cancer, given a positive result of a mammogram. Approximately 95%
of clinicians surveyed gave a numerical answer close to the inverse probability.
3. Base-rate fallacy
The base rate fallacy [18], also called base rate neglect, is a logical fallacy that occurs
when irrelevant information is used to make a probability judgment, especially when
empirical statistics about the probability are available (called the base rate or prior
probability). In a study done by Tversky and Kahneman, subjects were given the
following problem: a cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab
companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% of the cabs in the city
are Green and 15% are Blue. A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested
the reliability of the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night
of the accident and concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the two
colors 80% of the time and failed 20% of the time. What is the probability that the cab
involved in the accident was Blue rather than Green?
We define the following events: D=Datum: there was an accident. H=Hypothesis
to evaluate: it was a blue cab. From Bayes’ theorem, the correct answer
P (H|D) = P (D|H)P (H)
P (D|H)P (H) + P (D/H ′)P (H ′) (2)
=
0, 80 · 0, 15
0, 80 · 0, 15 + 0, 20 · 0, 85 = 0.41
Most subjects gave probabilities over 50%, and some gave answers over 80%.
According to the base-rate fallacy, this can be explained with the fact that people
tend to neglect the base rate, or prior probability, P (H).
Some researchers have considered the inverse fallacy as the result of people’s
tendency to consistently undervalue if not ignore the base-rate information presented
as a proxy for prior probabilities (e.g., [19, 20, 21]). Other researchers, however, have
proposed that the base-rate effect was in fact originating from the inverse fallacy and
not the reverse (e.g., [9, 10]). In support of this notion, in [10], Experiment 3, it was
found that participants who were trained to distinguish P (D|H) from P (H|D) were less
likely to exhibit base rate neglect compared to a control group.
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4. Quantum description of the inverse fallacy
In this section we introduce the basic formalism of quantum mechanics: we will not give
an exhaustive description of the formalism, we will only give the necessary notions. Our
main hypothesis is that the estimated probabilities of agents relevant to a certain event
can be deduced from the quantum formalism. We now give some important definitions,
valid both in classic and in quantum formalism:
1) An observable A is an event which can be verified. For any observable A we can
always write the dichotomous question ”is A true?”. In the following, we identify the
event A with the answer Yes, and we call A′ the answer No, or the negation of the event.
2) The preparation is any information previously given to the agent which can be used
to determine the estimated probabilities.
3) the opinion state (or simply state) of an agent is the result of the preparation.
4) P (A) is the estimated probability that the event is true, given a set of agents in a
particular state. Analogously, we call P (A′) the estimated probability that the event is
false. Of course, P (A) + P (A′) = 1.
If the agents know that A is true, the resulting estimated probability is P (A) = 1
and P (A′) = 0. In this case, the preparation of the opinion state is the information ”A
is true”.
In the quantum case, the statistic description of the event A is more complicated,
and involves the mathematical formalism of a complex separable Hilbert space H . The
main concept is that the opinion state of agents is described by a vector in a particular
complex separable Hilbert space H . For a dichotomous question, the dimension of the
H is 2, which gives the simplest quantum system, the qubit (containing the unit of
quantum information).
In order to describe a vector in the space H , we now give the standard bra-ket
notation usually used in quantum mechanics, introduced by Dirac [22]. According with
this notation, a vector in H is called a ket, and written as |s〉. This vector describes
the opinion state of agents. A simple example of a ket can be given in the case that the
agents already know that the observable A is true/false: in the true case, the resulting
vector is called |A〉, while in the false case A′〉. Since A excludes A′ (the observable can
not be observed simulaneously true and false), this condition must be written in terms
of a property of vector spaces: |A〉 and |A′〉 are orthogonal vectors, and thus form a
complete basis of H . This entails that any opinion state |s〉 can be written as a linear
combination of {|A〉, |A′〉}:
|s〉 = s0|A〉+ s1|A′〉 , (3)
with s0 and s1 complex numbers. We also say that the state |s〉 is a superposition of
the basis states {|A〉, |A′〉}.
The orthogonality can be descrived mathematically with the concept of inner
product : the inner product of two kets |s〉 and |s′〉 can be written, in the basis {|A〉, |A′〉},
as 〈s′|s〉 = s0s′0∗ + s1s′1∗, where s′i are the components of |s′〉 in the same basis. Thus
the inner product of |s〉 and its dual vector 〈s| is 〈s|s〉 = |s0|2+ |s1|2, and it is equal to 1
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if the vector is normalized. According to the bra-ket notation, the inner product 〈s′|s〉
forms a ”braket”. We now give three important properties of the inner product:
a) for two any mutually exclusive events A, A′, 〈A|A′〉 = 0
b) 〈A|A〉 = 1 (normalization property)
c) given an opinion state |s〉 and an observable |A〉, the estimed probability of A is
P (A) = |〈s|A〉|2 = |〈A|s〉|2.
From these properties, we have that {|A〉, |A′〉} form an ortonormal basis of H , and
they are useful in order to compute estimed probabilities.
The state |s〉 is called a pure state, and describes a quantum state for which the
preparation is complete: all the information which can be theorically provided have
been used. Moreover, from the properties of the inner product we can write
|s〉 =
√
P (A)|A〉+
√
A′eiφa |A′〉 , (4)
where P (A), P (A′) are the estimed probability, and eiφa is a phase, important in
interference effects (for example, see the conjunction fallacy [1]).
A mixed state describes a situation where there are different complete preparations
|si〉, but each associated with a probability Pi. This means that we can find some agents
within an opinion state |si〉 with a probability Pi. The mixed states are not represented
as vetors, but as matrices, the density matrix ρ:
ρ =
∑
i
Pi|si〉 〈si|, , (5)
And important property of ρ is that its diagonal elements in the basis of A are exactly
P (A) and P (A′).
4.1. Observables and collapse
Let us suppose that the preparation of the opinion state P (A) of the agents is such that
P (A) < 1. After the preparation, if they know that A is true, the resulting estimated
probability becomes P (A) = 1 and P (A′) = 0. The knowledge of agents about A has
increased.
In the quantum formalism we have a similar fact: given a preparation of the opinion
state |s〉 of the agents such that |〈s|A〉|2 < 1, if the agents know that A is true, the
resulting estimated probability becomes P (A) = 1, and the resulting state is |A〉. This
is called the collapse of the quantum state into a base vector, and has many important
consequances in the interpretations of quantum theory.
4.2. Conditional probability and inverse fallacy
We now consider two questions A and B, with the corresponding basis states {|A〉, |A′〉}
and {|B〉, |B′〉}. Moreover, we suppose that 0 < |〈A|B〉|2 < 1, which means that these
vectors are not parallel (and thus do not represent the same question).
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We can compute the conditional probability P (A|B) by noting that the previous
knowledge of the answer B entails that the actual state is |B〉 (see the collapse of state
vector). Thus we have that
P (A|B) = |〈A|B〉|2 = |〈B|A〉|2 = P (B|A) , (6)
which evidences that the quantum formalism naturally leads to the inverse fallacy. This
equality is always valid in quantum formalism, both for pure and mixed states. The fact
that the inverse fallacy manifests itself only in certain situations can be explained with
the presence of a bounded-rationality regime (which is the analogue of the quantum
regime).
In the present article we are not interested in the situations which lead to the
presence of such a regime; in fact, differently from other cognitive heuristics, the inverse
fallacy is always entailed by the quantum formalism: there are no states without inverse
fallacy.
4.3. Additivity
First of all we note that the completeness of the basis of H entails the simple condition
P (A|B) + P (A′|B) = 1 . (7)
Equation (6) of the quantum formalism entails the following equality, which is identical
to the additivity principle:
P (B|A) + P (B|A′) = 1 . (8)
It is important to note that equation (8) concerns the estimated probabilities, while
for real probabilities we have
P (B|A) + P (B|A′) = P (A|B)P (B)
P (A)
+
P (A′|B)P (B)
P (A′)
, (9)
which can be higher or lower than 1 (see [9]). There are experimental situations [9]
where agents judge P (A|B) = P (B|A), i.e. they commit the inverse fallacy, but the
given data are the probabilties P (B|A) and P (B|A′), whose sum can be higher or lower
than 1. Thus the agents commit inverse fallacy and judge P (A|B) = P (B|A), violating
equation (7). The problem is that the initial probabilities P (B|A) and P (B|A′) have
been provided as initial data, and have not been estimated by the agents. In this case
we say that the given information are not consistent with the quantum regime.
Finally the quantum formalism, through equation (8), leads to the following
equalities
P (A|B′) = P (A′|B) , P (A|B) = P (A′|B′) . (10)
This can be easily shown, for example in the first case, by noting that P (B′|A) =
P (A|B′) = 1− P (A|B) = 1− P (B|A) = P (B′|A).
Thus we have found very simple equations that link the conditional probabilities,
valid only in bounded-rationality regime: this confirms our hypothesis, that agents in
such a regime tend to estimate probabilities in an intuitive way.
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4.4. Change of basis
The additivity conditions (7), (8) and (10) are consistent with the quantum formalism.
This can be seen also by considering the unitary operators which represents the change
of basis from {|A〉, |A′〉} to {|B〉, |B′〉} and viceversa:
|B′〉 = e−iξ
√
P (B|A)|A′〉 − eiφ
√
P (B|A′)|A〉 (11)
|B〉 = e−iφ
√
P (B|A′)|A′〉+ eiξ
√
P (B|A)|A〉 .
The transformations above are a change of basis, which can be described in terms of a
special unitary operator Û (which preserves the normalization) such that
∑
ij Uij |ai〉 =
|bj〉. The transformation is defined uniquely by the three independent parameters
P (B|A), φ and ξ: in fact the other parameter P (B|A′) = 1−P (B|A) is not independent.
However, this trasformation is consistent with the definition of conditional probability
(6), as can be easily seen by using equation (10).
5. conclusions
In this article we have presented a description in the quantum formalism of the inverse
fallacy: we have shown that this fallacy is a natural and very general consequence of
the quantum formalism and of the Hilbert space laws.
This result makes stronger the point of view of quantum cognition, which studies
the behavour of agents in bounded-rationality regime. In particular, it is important
to note that the predictions of the quantum cognition are relevant to the estimated
probabilities, which follow different laws from the classic probability theory.
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